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BUSINESS PRACTICE REGARDING WARRANTIES IN THE SALE OF GOODS
By GEORGE G. BOGERT

and ELI E.

FINK

THE PROBLEM CONSIDERED

What warranties of quality are present-day buyers of goods
actually receiving? What is the business practice among manufacturers, wholesalers, retailers, and consumers with regard to guaranties of the performance of merchandise sold? How does modem
warranty law operate in American commercial life?
It was questions of this type which caused the writers to attempt a small laboratory investigation in this field. Members of
the class studying the law of Sales of Personal Property in the
University of Chicago Law School in 1929-30 were required to make
a written report regarding business practice in the law of warranties
of quality. Each student selected a particular kind of goods and a
special type of sale of those goods to which to apply himself. Thus,
one examined sales of automobiles by distributors to users, another sales of automobiles by manufacturers to distributors, a third
sales of pianos by manufacturers to users. Each student was directed to interview, personally or by mail, at least six different
sellers in the chosen class of business. It was deemed impracticable
to require interviews with buyers. Some investigators, however,
did obtain information from jobbers and retailers with regard to
their purchases. The students were asked to secure answers to the
following questions:
1. To what extent are express warranties given?
2. What are the terms of such warranties?
3. To what extent are warranties which would normally be implied

under Uniform Sales Act
a. tacitly left in effect?
b. made express?
c. excluded expressly or by reason of an inconsistent express
warranty?
4. To what extent are the remedies for breach of warranty which
would be available under the Uniform Sales Act
a. left in effect without mention?
*Professor Bogert teaches the subject of Sales in the University of Chicago Law School. Mr. Fink, now a member of the Chicago bar, was last
year an assistant in the course on Sales.
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b. made express?

c. broadened by the giving of a supplementary remedy?
d. expressly excluded by the substitution of another remedy?

Copies of sales contracts in actual use were to be attached to
the reports when possible.
The principal purposes of the instructor in requiring these investigations were: (1) to stimulate an intensive study of the common and statute law of warranties. The students could not intelligently talk with or write to business men about their practices
and correlate the information obtained without a reasonable familiarity with the controlling principles of case and statute law in the
field of express and implied warranties; (2) to prevent students
from getting the impression that rights of buyer and duties of
seller in the field of warranties rest entirely on the common law
rules restated in sections 12 to 14 of the Uniform Sales Act, and
to impress them with the powers of control which interparty agreements, trade association understandings, and standard forms of sales
contracts possess. The more naive disciple of the law, at least, is
prone to believe, for example, that every sale by description by a
dealer in goods of the kind sold involves an implied warranty of
merchantability and no other obligation; (3) to test the popularity
of existing warranty law among sellers and buyers. Assuming
freedom of contract (perhaps a large assumption), the exclusion
or inclusion of Sales Act warranties and remedies in typical sales
contracts ought to afford some evidence of the adaptation of the
Sales Act to present business conditions.
DIGEST OF THE REPORTS

The following lists indicate the topics covered by the eighty
reports received:

Machinery and Mechanical Devices
Incinerators (mfr. to user); cash registers (mfr. to user);
automatic weighing scales (mfr. to user); adding machines (mfr.
to user) ; floor surfacing machinery (mfr. to user) ; water heaters

(mfr. to user) ; vacuum cleaners (mfr. to user) ; oil burners (mfr.
to user) ; mechanical refrigerators (mfr. to user) ; washing machines
(dealer to user)) water softeners (mfr. to user); dry cleaning

tumblers (mfr. to user); steam pumps (mfr. to user); electric
toy trains (mfr. to dealer and user) ; motion picture machines- (mfr.
to user) ; radios (mfr. to dealer and user) ; radios (dealer to-user) ;
pianos (mfr. to user); radio loud speakers (mfr. to user); auto-
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mobiles (mfr. to distributor and distributor to user; two reports) ;
automobile bodies (mfr. to user) ; dutomobile tires (dealer to user) ;
storage batteries (mfr. to dealer and user, and dealer to user; two
reports) ; airplanes (mfr. to user) ; typewriters (mfr. to user).
Mineral Products
Monuments (quarrier and mfr. to user); coal (jobber to retailer and retailer to user; two reports).
Sporting Goods
Ivory billiard balls (mfr. to retailer) ; sporting firearms (mfr.
and dealer to user); sporting and athletic goods (dealer to user).
Prescription Goods
Optical lenses (retailer to user) ; drugs (retailer to user).
Jeweler's Goods
Watches (mfr. to retailer and user) ; plated silverware (mfr.
to user).
Household Furnishings
Domestic rugs (mfr. to retailer) ; oriental rugs (lealer to
user) ; furniture (mfr. to retailer; two reports); furniture (dealer
to user).
Food and Drink
Meat (packer to dealer; two reports); fresh fruit and vegetables (wholesaler to retailer; two reports) ; canned fruit and vegetables (canner to broker) ; milk (distributor to retailer) ; animal
feed (mfr. to user); coffee (wholesaler to retailer); candy (mfr.
to jobber) ; near beer (mfr. to retailer and user) ; flavoring extracts
(mfr. to user).
Wearing Apparel and Personal Articles
Smoking pipes (jobber to retailer) ; furs (mfr. to retailer and
retailer to user; two reports) ; dresses (wholesaler to retailer);
raincoats (mfr. to retailer) ; hair goods (mfr. to retailer); ladies'
hosiery (wholesaler to retailer) ; sweaters (mfr. to retailer) ; shoes
(mfr. to retailer).
Building Materials
Wall paper (mfr. to. jobber); roofing (mfr. to dealer); plumbing and heating fixtures (mfr. to contractor or user; two reports) ;
flat glass (wholesaler to retailer); paints and varnishes (mfr. to
retailer and retailer to user; two reports) ; brick (mfr. to user);
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furnaces (retailer to user) ; boilers (mfr. to user) ; electric renewable fuses (mfr. to jobber and jobber to user).
Miscellaneous
Dies (mfr. to user); printer's ink (mfr. to user); advertising
specialties (jobber to user); envelopes (mfr. to user); fountain
pens (mfr. to user); starch (mfr. to wholesaler).
Cases of No Express Warranty. In twenty-two of the eighty
reports a total or partial absence of any express warranty was found.
In some cases the exceedingly low grade or quality of the article
explained the failure to warrant, as in the case of Idinker brick
and the cheaper brands of sporting firearms and smoking pipes.
In auction sales of oriental rugs the buyer is put on his guard and
no guaranty is made. In the following cases the sale is customarily
by description or sample and the implied warranty thus arising
obviates the necessity of any express warranty: envelopes, ladies'
hose, automobile bodies, coal, starch, fresh fruit and vegetables,
milk, meat, optical lenses, drug prescriptions, and sweaters. In
other instances the absence of an express warranty is wholly or
partly explained by the delicate or perishable nature of the goods
and the ease with which the buyer could injure or destroy them
by abuse. In this class fall the sales of ladies' hose, furs, sporting
goods, fresh fruits and vegetables, meat and printer's ink. In sales
of furs, fire brick, face brick, flat glass, and oriental rugs it is said
that the peculiar character of the goods makes it particularly hazardous for the seller to forecast the performance or the specific
grade of the goods. Where the buyer is skilled and the goods are
open to inspection (as in the case of the sale of fruits, vegetables,
and meat at wholesale), it is natural that there should be no express warranty. And so, if the goods are to receive especially
hard usage, as when silverware is sold for use in hotels and othdr
public places, the lack of a warranty is reasonable. In many cases
the reports allege that although there is no express warranty, the
sellers are in fact very liberal in making .adjustments to reliable
customers. This latter fact was especially mentioned in the reports
on sporting goods, automobile bodies, oriental rugs, and sweaters.
Typical Express Warranties. In the great majority of cases
one or more express warranties were given. These warranties,
while possessing many slight variances, may be classed into nine
groups, as follows:
(1) Absolute satisfaction. This warranty was comparatively
rare but was found in the sale of hair goods, furnaces (two cases),
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paints and varnishes (mfr. to retailer), plated silverware (five out
of six cases), oil burners (one case), floor surfacing machinery
(three out of six cases), and incinerators (two out of six cases).
(2) Freedom from defects in materials or workmanship. This
was found to be a very common form of guaranty, appearing in at
least thirty-two of the eighty reports, and being especially common in the case of the sale by a manufacturer of machinery or
other mechanical appliances. It was reported to be given in the
case of the sale of cash registers, incinerators, scales, adding machines, electric fuses, floor, surfacing machinery, water heaters,
vacuum cleaners, oil burners, mechanical refrigerators, washing machines, water softeners, dry cleaning tumblers, steam pumps, electric toy trains, motion picture machines, watches, radios, pianos,
radio loud speakers, furniture (retailer to user, five out of seven),
automobiles, automobile tires, storage batteries, airplanes, better
grades of sporting firearms, plumbing and heating fixtures, furnaces,
boilers, dresses, shoes, typewriters. The warranty is limited in
time, dependent on the character of the article and the period deemed
necessary to bring out weaknesses in ordinary use.
(3) Particular detailed performance or capacity. In a few
cases it was reported that the seller guaranteed that the goods would
possess certain named qualities (as, for example, be waterproof
in the cases of roofing), or perform a certain named amount of
work or type of work, or last for a specific period. Examples of
this type of warranty were found in sales of floor surfacing machinery (four out of six cases), water heaters, oil burners (three
out of six cases), water softeners, especially good tires, storage
batteries, standard sporting firearms, furnaces (four out of six
cases), paint, and raincoats.
(4) Warranty against particular harmful or disadvantageous
results. In a few cases statements as to performance were made in
a negative form, and guarantees made against harmful traits. Thus,
in the case of hair goods it is usual to warrant against harmful
effects to the person; in the case of smoking pipes against burning
out or cracking; in rare cases in the sale of fruits and vegetables
against rotting or freezing; in sales of radio loud speakers against
rattles under certain conditions; in sales of monuments against
splitting or cracking under weather; and in some cases of floor
surfacing machinery against dust in operation.
(5)
Compliance with statutory requirements. Where goods
have been subjected to inspection or regulation under statute, it is
common to find the seller warranting that the goods meet the statu-
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tory demands. The best case of this type discovered was that of
the federal Pure Food and Drug Act, compliance with which was
guaranteed in the case of sales of meat, canned fruit and vegetables,
coffee, candy, and flavoring extracts.
(6) Compliance with trade association specifications. Occasionally a trade association lays down standards and the seller
agrees that his product meets these requirements. This is true with
boilers (code of American Society of Mechanical Engineers), wallpaper (standards of Wallpaper Association of the United States),
and electric fuses (standards of National Board of Fire Underwriters).
(7) Goods tested before shipment. Occasionally, as in the
case of two scales manufacturers, a seller warrants that the goods
were inspected before being shipped by him.
(8) In good condition when shipped. Closely akin to the last
named warranty is the assurance sometimes given that the goods
were not damaged or broken when shipped. This applies naturally
to goods especially liable to injury in shipment. Examples are found
in sales of electric toy trains, monuments, advertising specialties,
billiard balls, and candy.
(9) Against patent infringement. Occasionally the seller of
a patented machine warrants against patent infringement. This
was true in the case of one manufacturer of floor surfacing "machinery and one manufacturer of water softeners. If not so treated,
the point would seem to be covered by the implied warranty of
good right to sell.
Special Treatment of Accessories. In some cases where the
seller is a manufacturer but buys parts of the machine from others
and merely attaches or assembles the parts furnished by others
and those made by himself, the manufacturer has made a special
statement in his sales contract regarding the accessory parts. In
most cases the seller of the completed product excludes any warranty on his part as to the accessories. This is true with airplanes, automobiles, radios, washing machines, and in one case with
water heaters. But in sales of steam pumps and in two cases of
water heaters, the seller of the completed machine liinits his warranty of the accessories to the same terms as that of the warranty
of the manufacturer of the accessory -parts.
Implied Warranties. In no case was it reported that an implied warranty arising under the Sales Act was expressly stated
by the seller in the language of the act. The cases in which the
express warranties given in effect partly or entirely corresponded
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In a number of instances, however, one or more remedies for
breach of warranty were expressly provided for in the contract.
The Sales Act remedy of rescission (or return of the goods with
money refunded) was expressly mentioned by sellers of shoes, hair
goods, rain coats, dresses, furs, and in three cases of floor surfacing machinery. The Sales Act remedies of recoupment, counterclaim, and action for damages naturally were not expressly named,
since no seller would care to picture litigation to a prospective buyer.
In many cases sellers provided for remedies not named in the
Sales Act. Typical cases are those of repair (typewriters, fountain
pens, dresses, boilers, roofing, electric toy trains, oil burners, adding machines, scales, and cash registers), replacement (raincoats,
dresses, furs, paint, brick, plumbing fixtures, heating fixtures, wall
paper, smoking pipes, plated silverware, pianos, monuments, washing machines, oil burners in one case, vacuum cleaners, floor surfacing machinery in two cases, electric fuses, scales in three cases, and
incinerators), repair or replacement at the seller's option (furnaces,
roofing in one case, storage batteries in three cases, automobile tires,
radio loud speakers, radios, watches, advertising specialities, dry
cleaning tumblers, water softeners, mechanical refrigerators in one
case, oil burners in one case, dies, water heaters, scales in two
cases), repair or adjustment in the accounts of the parties (storage
batteries in three cases), and replacement or adjustment in the

mutual accounts (flavoring extracts, near beer, candy, animal feed,
vegetables and fruit in the rare cases of warranty, furniture at retail, furniture in sales by manufacturer, and domestic rugs). It is
understood, of course, that where a single part of a machine proves
defective the remedy of repair or replacement refers to the defective part or parts only.
In a few cases (water heaters (3), oil burners (1), mechanical
refrigerators (2), water softeners (3), steam pumps (4), automobiles, and airplanes) repair or replacement was clearly stipulated
to be the exclusive remedy available to the buyer in case of breach
of warranty. It is probable that many other sellers feel that the
mere mention of a remedy for breach of warranty amounts to an
implied exclusion of all other remedies, but the cases" tend to
treat an expressly named remedy as supplementary to the common
law or statutory remedies, unless expressly made exclusive.
Trade Associations. The following trade associations are reported to have great influence in deciding what warranties shall
1. Eyers v. Hardden (1895) 70 Fed. 648; Inmr Shoe Tire Co. v. Tondro
(Calif. 1927) 257 Pac. 211 (manufacturer's standard warranty).
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be given in their respective businesses: Associated Fur Manufacturers, Inc., Wall Paper Association of United States, National
Automobile Chamber of Commerce, National Rug and Carpet Institute, Radio Manufacturers' Association, National Battery Manufacturers Association, Rubber Association of America, Jewelers Institute Association, Hydraulic Society (steam pumps).
The standard automobile warranty is as follows:
"WARRANT each new motor vehicle manufactured by us, whether
passenger car or commercial vehicle, to be free from defects in material
and workmanship under normal use and service, our obligation under
this warranty being limited to making good at our factory any part or
parts thereof which shall, within ninety (90) days after delivery of
such vehicle to the original purchaser, bel returned to us with transportation charges prepaid, and which our examination shall, disclose
to our satisfaction to have been thus defective; this warranty being
expressly in lieu of all other warranties expressed or implied and of
all other obligations or liabilities on our part, and we neither assume
nor authorize any other person to assume for us any other liability in
connection with the sale of our vehicles.
"This warranty shall not apply to any vehicle which shall have
been repaired or altered outside of our factory in any way so as, in our
judgment, to affect its stability, or reliability, nor which has been subject to misuse, negligence or accident, nor' to any commercial vehicle
made by us which shall have been operated at a speed exceeding the
factory rated speed, or loaded beyond the factory rated load capacity.
"We make no warranty whatever in respect to tires, rims, ignition
apparatus, horns or other signaling devices, starting devices, generators,
batteries, speedometers or other trade accessories inasmuch as they are
usually warranted separately by their respective manufacturers."
The standard tire warranty is as follows:
"Every pneumatic tire of our manufacture bearing our name and
serial number is warranted by us against defects in material and workmanship during the life of the tire to the extent that if any tire fails
because of such defect, we will either repair the tire or make reasonable
allowance on the purchase of a new tire."
The standard radio warranty is as follows:
"We guarantee this radio receiver against all defects in workmanship or material for ninety days after date of sale to original purchaser, provided that our inspection reveals no tampering with or
repairing outside of our own factory."
The standard passenger car battery warranty is as follows:
"The manufacturer guarantees to repair or replace at its option
f.o.b. factory or any authorized service station, without charge to the
user, except transportation, any battery of its manufacture which fails
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the fact that the institution may have originated historically in the
application of some familiar notion to a new purpose (as in the
case of the marriage ceremony) .7
Maine speaks of adoption as being one of the most important
and helpful of fictions, without telling us what is fictitious about
adoption.74 The social and legal institution of adoption is not a
fiction in any ordinary sense. If there is any fiction involved in
the idea of adoption it is in one of the following notions. (1) It
is convenient to describe the institution by saying that the adopted
child is treated as if he were a natural child. But this is a mere
convenience of linguistic expression. (2) In primitive society, because of the extreme tenacity of the intellectual concepts of the
primitive mind, adoption as a social institution probably would not
have been possible without some pretense of blood relationship.
This is illustrated in the ceremonies which accompany adoption
in primitive society, as where the child is dropped through the
clothing of the adopting parent in imitation of birth. 75 (3) The
original invention of the notion of adoption involved, probably, an
imaginative flight, an exercise of ingenuity, similar to that which
attends the birth of a legal fiction. But none of these facts means
that adoption, as a social institution existing in present-day society,
is a fiction.
One should also guard against the converse sort of error, that
of supposing that because there is a social reality back of a fictitious
statement, the statement itself is therefore non-fictitious. Professor
Sturm protests that the quasi-contract is not a fiction because it represents a social institution, that in such-and-such cases recovery may
be had in the courts. 76 But this does not keep the term quasi-con73. Upon a somewhat deeper level of discourse, a social or legal institution may be regarded as a fiction in the philosophic sense in which the
word "fiction" is used by Vaihinger. In fact (or at least "in fact" if one
does not penetrate to a still deeper plane of discourse) we have only an
enormous number of individual acts by individual human beings, never taking
quite the same form and never having quite the same purpose. To introduce simplicity into this chaos of individual actions, we postulate certain
"institutions," we group together certain recurring acts which show a thread
of similarity into a conceptual entity which we call an institution. A later
age may classify our actions upon an entirely different basis than that we
are accustomed to, may see in our conduct an entirely different set of "institutions." Conversely, our classification of our own actions into "institutions" may seem as arbitrary and unreal to a later age, as the concept of
"seisin" seems arbitrary and unreal to the modern student of law.
74. "Ancient Law" ch. II.
75. P. J. Hainilton-Grierson "An Example of Legal Make-Believe"
(1908) 20 Juridical Rev. 32 and (1909) 21 id. 17. Strangely enougbt the
ceremony of dropping the child through the clothing is performed even
when the adopting person is a man.
76. Slurnm "Fiktion mid Vergleich in der Rechtswissenschaft' p. 47.
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to give satisfactory service within a period of 90 days from date of
sale to the user.
"ADJUSTMENT WARRANTY:
The manufacturer further
agrees after expiration of the 90 days' guarantee period to replace
with a new battery, on a pro rata basis, any, battery which fails in
normal passenger service.
"Normal passenger car service is considered not over 1,000 miles
per month.
"The adjusment period to be established by the manufacturer based
on the quality of the battery, but in no case to exceed 18 months.
"All adjustments are to be based on the current list price plus
transportation charges.
"Example: A battery carrying 12 months' adjustment warranty
listing at $12.00, fails in service in 9 months from date of purchase.
The user receives a new battery of the same type for 9/12 of $12.00,
or $9.00, plus transportation charges.
Consequential Damages Excluded. In a few instances reports
show that sellers stipulate that all or certain consequential damages
apt to flow from a breach of warranty are not recoverable against
the seller. The buyer is obliged to bear the risk of loss from such
consequential or "contingent" damages in some cases in the sale
of dies,, water heaters, oil burners, steam pumps, roofing, and
plumbing and heating fixtures.
Manufacturer's Direct Liability Recognized. In nine cases the
warranty of the manufacturer is made in terms direct to the consumer or user, ignoring the dealer or retailer, and the practice
is that the manufacturer makes good to the ultimate-user for defects in the goods either by direct dealing or through the agency
of the dealer who acts as an intermediary for transmitting complaints. These cases are the sales of typewriters, fountain pens,
boilers, paints, sporting firearms, storage batteries, automobiles,
radios, and watches. The manufacturers of these articles thus
recognize the fairness of responsibility by them to the remote user
of their goods and the impolicy of asserting the legalistic notion
of privity of contract which would compel the user to seek a remedy
against the dealer and the dealer against the manufacturer. Obviously under the dangerous instrumentality theory in torts it is
possible that the manufacturers of boilers, firearms, and automobiles
might be liable to users for serious defects.
COMMENT ON THE REPORTS: THE MANUFACTURER'S STANDARD
WARRANTY

Perhaps the most interesting feature of sales contracts noticed by the reports is the standard manufacturer's warranty

25 ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW

clause. As previously shown, it is a guaranty for a limited period
against defects in the materials or workmanship of the goods sold
by the manufacturer, the sole or a supplemental remedy for breach
usually being repair or replacement of the defective part on certain
conditions.
Prior to the Sales Act the common law generally placed on the
manufacturing seller an implied obligation that his goods were fit
for the purpose for which the buyer stated he desired to use them,
if the buyer relied on the seller to select such goods. The English
view was that this liability was absolute and not avoided by proof
on the part of the manufacturer that he had used reasonable care
in selecting materials and employing workmen.2 The New York
view was that the manufacturing seller discharged his duty by using reasonable care with regard to raw materials and workmanship,
thus making the standard one of negligenceS The Sales Act restated the English common law rule.4 At common law the manufacturing seller was said to be relieved of this warranty if the buyer
had ordered a "known, described, specific" article, provided that
the thing furnished answered the description of the known, described, specific thing, no matter whether it fitted the buyer's purpose or not.; The Sales Act has perpetuated something like this
exception in different language by providing that there shall be no
implied warranty of fitness for purpose when the sale is "under a
patent or trade name. '6
Thus, for many years, in most American jurisdictions, the
manufacturing seller has, in the absence of express stipulation to
the contrary, been under a rather heavy burden of insurance of
the performance of his goods. The buyer's purpose in ordering
the goods is nearly always expressly stated to the seller, or is impliedly made known to him from the nature of the goods and the
buyer's business. If a shoe manufacturer orders shoe manufacturing machinery, his intent to apply the goods in making shoes does
not have to be spelled out in capital letters in order to inform the
seller, nor is reliance on the seller's skill to manufacture machinery
adequate to the purpose a fact hard to find. As shown above, in
the case of the sale of large numbers of manufactured products
of moderate cost, the modern tendency has been strong to exclude
2. Randall v. Newson, (1877) 2 Q. B. D. 102; Rodgers v. Niles (1860)
11 Oh. St 48.
3. Hoe v. Sanborn (1860) 21 N. Y. 552.
4. Sec. 15.

5. Seitz v. Brewers' Refrigerator Co. (1891) 141 U. S.510.
6.

Sec. 15.
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this guaranty of desired performance of the article as a unit, and
to limit the warranty of the manufacturer to an assurance that none
of the parts of the manufactured product will prove within a limited
time to be of defective material or workmanship. The emphasis
is being changed from an absolute assurance of satisfactory performance of the article as a whole to an absolute guaranty of the
strength and processing of the parts. The new substituted express
warranty does not seek to restrict the manufacturer's liability to
negligence only.
It is interesting to observe the express warranty cases noted in
the American digest system as arising prior to 1896. They are
predominantly concerned with warranties of horses, cattle, agricultural products, raw materials, and only occasionally with machinery.
In the few cases where the subject-matter of the sale was machinery
or other manufactured product, the seller usually guaranteed that
the article would perform detailed work in a certain manner and
would operate as well as any other machine of the same kind.7
The manufacturing seller thus assumed a burden as great or greater
than that which the law would have placed upon him by implication. But with the tremendous development in the manufacture
of machinery and other mechanical appliances which has come about
in the last three decades, with the increasing complexity of such
machines, and with the organization of the sellers into associations
has come a strong tendency to reduce to a minimum the warranties
of specified performance and place emphasis solely on mechanical
perfection.
The terms of the manufacturer's warranty at first sight may
seem somewhat unduly favorable to the seller. The defect which
constitutes a breach must appear in normal use within a short
period after delivery of the goods. The burden is on the buyer
to prove normal use. The seller is the judge of the buyer's case
and of the remedy to be applied. If the buyer keeps the article
without use for a long period after delivery, he may find that the
guaranty period has expired before he has given the goods a real
test.
Apparently the warranty gives the buyer no assurance that the
design of the article is safe or appropriate to any particular purpose. Thus, probably a washing machine would comply with this
7. Aultman & Co. v. Weber (1888) 28 II. App. 91; Street v. Chapman

(1867) 29 Ind. 142; Latham v. Shipley (1892) 86 Iowa 543; Briggs v. Rumely
Co. (1895) 96 Iowa 202; First National Bank v. Erickson (1886) 20 Neb. 580;
Dounce .v. Dow (1874) 57 N. Y. 16; Hazelton Boiler Ca. v. Fargo Gas &
Elec. Co. (1894) 4 N. D. 365; Elkins v. Kenyon (1874) 34 Wis. 93.
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guaranty, if each part was of strong wood or metal and well formed,
although in use the machine might launder clothes only with danger
or damage. The demonstration usually given with manufactured
products of this type would doubtless disclose any serious defect
in design.
The frequent limitation of liability under this warranty with
regard to accessories made by others is noteworthy. This clause
applies to automobile horns and lamps, and radio tubes, for example.
The attitude of the manufacturer of the completed article with
regard to accessories is doubtless based on the grounds that the
accessory manufacturers warrant such article so that no warranty
by the main manufacturer is needed, and also that it is not fair to
expect a warranty of the accessory from the principal manufacturer
since he merely buys and attaches the accessory and knows nothing
of its materials or construction. But both of these reasons seem
fallacious. The purchaser of the complete automobile, for example, has no contractual relation with the manufacturer of the
bodies, tires, horns, lamps, and other separate parts. He could
not hold such manufacturers of parts on assurances they might
make to automobile manufacturers under the generally prevailing
theory of warranty law, which requires privity of contract between
warrantor and warrantee. Even though sellers of accessories voluntarily make replacement or repairs in favor of drivers of cars,
the latter ought not to be obliged to take up with distant parties,
strangers in law to them, adjustments regarding defective parts.
The user contracted for a unit, not for a group of parts. Secondly,
the ignorance of the automobile manufacturer regarding the business of the accessory manufacturer is not important, since the automobile manufacturer obviously sold the automobile and all its parts,
and warranty law is founded on sale coupled with reliance by the
buyer, and not upon any theory of care or negligence by the seller.
The standard warranty usually provides repair or replacement
as the sole or as a supplementary remedy. The buyer is almost
always required to bear the expense of returning the machine or its
parts to the seller. The seller stands the expense of repair or replacement. The remedy is conditioned on absence of a previous
attempt by the buyer to have the goods repaired by himself or by a
third party, if such other repair or alteration has in the opinion of
the seller injuriously affected the goods. Consequential damages are
sometimes excluded. Repair or replacement is apparently limited to
one occasion. If the part repaired or replaced should give trouble,
apparently the buyer is to have no recourse against the seller. Thus,
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to put an extreme case, if one purchases an automobile under the
standard warranty, and while driving it in a normal way withil
ninety days after delivery, an axle breaks and the buyer is killed,
his representative may be limited to a return of the broken axle
to the factory at his own expense and the obtaining of a new axle.
There can be no recovery for the destruction of the remainder
of the car or for the death of the buyer, although both were obviously proximately caused by the breach of warranty that the
axle was of sound materials and good workmanship.
If it be admitted that some or all of these manufacturers'
warranty clauses are unfair to the buyer, it may be urged that the
buyers are at fault in accepting such inadequate protection and deserve no sympathy. This argument, however, ignores a certain
limitation on freedom of contract in such cases. Many manufacturers, as previously noted, have formed trade organizations and
agreed to tho universal use of these limited warranty clauses.
Many buyers have no choice. If they desire to purchase an automobile, a radio, or a storage battery, they must accept the standard, uniform contract.
If this condition of seller's control over the contract develops
and continues, the most direct and practical relief may be an amendment to the Uniform Sales Act, inserting the manufacturer's warranty of materials and workmanship into the act as an implied warranty, broadening it to meet the possible objections to it named
above, and making waivers by the buyer of such a warranty and
the remedies thereunder void. The constitutionality of such a statute might, of course, be questioned, but it is believed that the positions of seller and buyer of manufactured articles, when trade associations and standard contracts are in effect, may become so
unequal that the legislatures may be justified in applying in such
cases a rule similar to those laid down in the chattel mortgage cases
where there is an attempt to waive the right of redemption," conditional sales contracts which seek to stipulate for a waiver of the
buyer's rights regarding his equity," and carriage 0 and employment" contracts which purport to relieve the carrier or employer

from liability for his own negligence. Clauses of this type have
been declared void as against public policy. If the modern seller
achieves such a superiority of position over the modern buyer,
8. Hughes v. Harlan, (1901)

166 N. Y. 427.
9. Crowe v. Liquid Carlbonic Co. (1913) 208 N. Y. 396.

10. Cox v. Central Vt. R. (1898) 170 Mass. 129.
11. Johnston v. Fargo (1906) 184 N. Y. 379.
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through patents, combinations, trade associations, and uniform contracts forced on the buyer, why should not the legislatures step in
and insist on the recognition of certain minimum rights and remedies on the part of the buying public?
Some argument for the addition of such a suggested implied
warranty to the Sales Act list may be found in certain weaknesses
in the implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for purpose.
The former is vague in its nature. The courts and learned authors
disagree on its meaning.1 The latter is excluded by a sale under
a patent or trade name and many manufactured products are now
sold by such names 3
In Snelling v. Dine1 4 the defendant, a retailer, contracted to
buy from the plaintiff, a manufacturer, fifty Socold refrigerators.
When sued for breach of contract in refusing to take more than
ten refrigerators, the defendant sought to reduce the recovery by
way of recoupment on the ground that some of the ten refrigerators
furnished by the plaintiff and resold by the defendant did not operate efficiently in the hands of the purchasers from the defendant.
The court held that the sale was under a trade name and therefore
there was no warranty implied that the refrigerators would be fit
for any particular purpose; and that the refrigerators were merchantable because salable in the market as Socold refrigerators, although they were not so efficienf as the defendant expected. There
was no express warranty in the contract, although refrigerator
manufacturers in the Chicago area, according to the reports here
discussed, include the standard manufacturer's warranty against
defects in materials or workmanship. Thus, the defendant had to
pay the full damages, a result which seems an obvious injustice.
An implied warranty of the standard manufacturers' type would
have aided the buyer in this case and would have worked justice.
It would seem that the law should imply those warranties which
honest and fair minded sellers and buyers, acting freely, customarily
make as the elementary bases of their contracts. The implied warranties of the Sales Act are doubtless based on the business prac12. See, for example, Bristol Trainways v. Fiat Motors [1910] 2 K. B.
831, 841; Howard v. Hoey (1840) 23 Wend. (N. Y.) 350; Goldmark v. Simon
Bros. Co. (1923) 110 Neb. 614; Mechem "Sales" sec. 1340; Williston "Sales"
sec. 243.
13. Aetna Chemical Co. v. Spaulding Co. (Vt. 1924) 126 Atl. 582;
Braden v. Mountain Iron Co. (1929) 32 F. (2d) 244; Parker v. Shaghalian,&
Co. (1923) 244 Mass. 19.
14. (Mass. 1930) 170 N. E. 403; for similar cases see Wilson v. Lawrence
(Mass. 1855) 1 N. E. 278; Gossler v. Eagle Sugar Refinery (1869) 103 Mass.
331; Harris v. Waite (1879) 51 Vt. 481.
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ice of England in the nineteenth centry. They were codified in
England in 1893 and taken over with little change in America in
1906. At the time of the formation of these rules machinery and
other similar mechanical products as articles of commerce were
much less common and complex than nowadays. It may well be
that the rapid development of machinery and mechanical devices
and the growth of an accepted business practice among sellers and
buyers of such articles justifies the addition to the act of a separate
classification of sales and a separate implied warranty thereunder.
The wide spread of the standard manufacturers' warranty creates
a presumption that some term of this type is needed in contracts
for the sale of machinery. If the standard warranty is found liberal enough toward the buyer, the matter may well be left to express contract; but if the seller's position enables him unduly to
limit the warranty, the legislatures may properly extend and amplify the warranty and the remedies thereunder somewhat, so as to include the features which honest and fair minded parties would
provide if they were on an equal basis and contracting freely.
The above criticisms of the manufacturers' standard warranty
undoubtedly have some weight, but it should be borne in mind that
in a majority of cases the manufacturer has not made the standard
warranty his sole obligation with regard to the quality of the goods,
and that other practical factors improve the buyer's position. In the
great majority of sales of machinery and mechanical devices the
sale is by sample, description, or trade name, and the buyer thus
obtains one or more ofi the warranties of correspondence with
sample, description or trade name, or the warranty of merchantability. If, for example, one buys a "Majestic Radio, Model 211,"
there is usually an order for the goods under that description and
a demonstration through the use and exhibition of another machine,
so that the buyer generally obtains an implied warranty that the
machine furnished is of the trade name description and like the
sample shown. The demonstration enables the buyer to discover
any patent unfitness for his purpose. These implied warranties,
coupled with the standard express warranty, probably in most cases
give the buyer adequate protection.
In addition, the ordinary buyer gets the benefit of the common
maxim--"the buyer is always right." The reports contain strong
evidence that the modem seller will go to great lengths to please his
customers. In practice he does not stop at his legal obligations,
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but takes any reasonable steps to retain good will.
The strict
letter of the law is enforced by the seller only against buyers who
are exceedingly unreasonable or are strongly suspected of fraudulent practices.
As previously shown, the practice among manufacturers and
dealers with regard to the operation of the manufacturer's warranty
against defects in material and workmanship is that the complaints
are satisfied either by the manufacturer directly or through the
agency of the dealer. The manufacturer assumes that he is directly
liable to the user. If the complaint goes through the dealer, it is,
for convenience's sake. The dealer does not regard himself as
having any personal responsibility. All parties regard him as ,a conduit or intermediary for adjustment purposes, even though he has
himself warranted the goods and sold them as his own. These
facts manifest a practical repudiation by the manufacturers and
dealers of the legalistic notion' 6 that warranties of personal property should be effective only between parties in privity of contract.
Business practice in this regard is in accord with the minority
of the American courts,' 7 and may, if supported by other commercial
usage, justify an overthrow of the majority privity of contract theory. Such a result would be another praiseworthy assimilation
of the law of real and personal property.
Certain other fundamental tendencies in the manufacturers'
and dealers' contracts and practices are noticeable. The first is a
recognition of the economy of separability. At common law and
under the act, without express provision to the contrary, a defect
in a part of a machine which constituted a breach of warranty
would justify the buyer in rejecting the whole contract, or recovering damages for breach of the contract as a whole. The result of
such a unit treatment might well be that the seller would have on
his hands a rejected or returned article which he would have to
sell at a sacrifice, or that the buyer would allow the 'machine to
deteriorate or become ruined, depending for protection on the breach
15. The president of a wall paper company stated: "If one of our
customers puts our paper on the wall, and then decides he doesn't like it for
any reason whatsoever, we take it back, regardless of whether there is a defect or not, and the factory will cooperate with us."
16. Rittenhouse-Winterson Auto Co. v. Kissner (Md. 1916) 98 Atl. 361

(a case of the standard manufacturer's warranty) ; Pelletier v. Dupont (Me.

1925) 128 AtI. 186; Gearing v. Berkson (1916) 223 Mass. 257; Ford v. WillysOverland (1929) 197 N. 'C. 147; Chysky V. Drake Bros. Co., Inc. (1923)
235 N. Y. 468.
17. Ward Baking Co. v. Trizzihw (Ohio 1928) 161 N. E. 557; Coca Cola
Bottling Works v. Lyons (Miss. 1927) 111 So. 305.
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of warranty. Thus, there might be an economic waste. Under
the standard contract the seller is given an opportunity to repair
his defective performance and the machine is saved for immediate
effective use by one who needs it, instead of being thrown back
on the seller or left idle.
The second tendency observable is the desire to avoid litigation. The delays, expenses, and uncertainties of law suits have in
other contracts induced parties to provide for arbitration of disputes. In these standard manufacturers' agreements the seller, who
has drawn the contract, is in substance made arbitrator of any dispute between himself and the buyer. The seller decides whether
there is a defect which occurred in normal use, whether the buyer
has prejudicially affected the article by a previous effort to repair
it, and whether, if the buyer's complaint is justified, there shall be
repair or replacement. The seller insists that there shall be no litigation. If the seller refused to live up to his agreement, to repair
or replace, doubtless the buyer could get damages based on the
cost of securing repair or replacement elsewhere, or in case of
unique articles or parts (as in the case of patents) might secure
specific performance of the contract to repair or replace; but these
possibilities of litigation which the standard clause leaves open are
rather remote. Doubtless it is felt that the manufacturer's desire to
obtain and retain good will under the highly competitive conditions
of modern business is a sufficient assurance that the manufacturing
seller will be liberal and reasonable in satisfying complaints about
defective parts.

